Information Technologies and organizations

Article Abstract:

Carnegie Mellon University Professor of Computer Science and Psychology Herbert A. Simon, the 1978 Nobel Prize Winner in Economics, believes that there are disadvantages in the move towards corporate decentralization: the proliferation of divisional autonomy, coupled with modern information technologies, has created more information than can be consumed by users. Simon believes that corporate information strategies must address the processing of information based on what is needed to make a decision and management must consume information merely because it is readily available. In the area of privacy and control of information, Simon believes that management, in order to improve the decision making process, must be cognizant of what types of information are relevant when designing their information systems.

Analysis, Information technology, College faculty, Economic research, Corporate culture, Carnegie-Mellon University, Organizational communication, Simon, Herbert Alexander, interview

---

Agency and efficiency in nonprofit organizations: the case of 'specific health focus' charities

Article Abstract:

The technical and allocative efficiency of nonprofit organizations is examined in relation to the composition of their board of trustees. Analysis of 72 specific health charities is used to test whether a larger proportion of outsider trustees as compared to insiders, results in better organizational performance, bacause outsiders presumably have more incentive for close monitoring of organizational activities. Data envelopement analysis is used to develop technical efficiency measures. Allocative efficiency is measured as the product of the resulting technical efficiency index and charity costs. Both measures are then regressed against the organization's proportion of insider trustees and its debt-value ratio. The results do not confirm the hypothesized relationships.

Management, Evaluation, Organizational effectiveness, Nonprofit organizations, Trusts and trustees, Trustees, Trusts (Law)

---

The value of private pre-decision information in a principal-agent context

Article Abstract:

The welfare effect of information access to employees poses a problem in the design of management accounting systems since a conflict arises in the assessment of employee performance because decision-making may have been based on such detailed information. This study examines the accounting system using a principal-agent model. No consequential beneficial effect is observed in the principal when improvement of the pre-decision information structure of the agent is made. The model illustrates an agent's improved coordination between information signal and action choice resulting from a private pre-decision information of the agent.

Models, Information management, Management information systems, Agency (Law), Managerial accounting

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: A life-cycle model of organizational federations: the case of hospitals. Organizational dispute resolution systems: a complementarities model
• Abstracts: Managing dysfunctional emotions in organizations. The management of meaning in the Polish crisis
• Abstracts: Applicant attraction strategies: an organizational perspective. part 2 International variation in the business-government interface: institutional and organizational considerations
• Abstracts: Techies of White House plug in the president and want to attach the cable's other end to you. Trinity Computers miscalculate and some investors pull the plug
• Abstracts: Estate planning and the family business. Benchmarking with ABCM

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.