Software piracy: an analysis of protection strategies
Article Abstract:
One theory of software piracy is that it hurts software companies by lowering their profits and hurts customers by increasing prices, but a model demonstrates that not protecting software can increase profits while lowering software prices. The key to the model is combining the fact that the number of program users is increased by piracy with a positive network externality, which exists because of customers' incentive to economize on the costs of customization and post-purchase learning. Network externality is strong if the software is difficult to learn, requires extensive customization by users, and is useful for formal networking or multi-user data processing. Software protection increases the costs of pirating and reduces the number of users because some software pirates will avoid purchasing the software.
Publication Name: Management Science
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0025-1909
Year: 1991
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Linear optimal designs and optimal contingency plans
Article Abstract:
Formulas can be developed for complex design problems, and the formulas can be solved through the use of multiple-criteria and multiple-constraint level simplex methods. Possible solutions must first be chosen, followed by the development of contingency plans for each solution under each potential uncertain situation. The optimal design problem is then reduced to a decision problem involving uncertainty and a limited number of alternatives. The optimal solution can then be found by applying established techniques.
Publication Name: Management Science
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0025-1909
Year: 1990
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