Corporate governance - who needs it?

Article Abstract:

Effective corporate governance of listed companies could be enhanced by the presence of both independent auditors and non-executive directors on these companies' boards. Independent auditors can provide the requisite objectivity needed to protect the interests of investors. They are also in an excellent position to detect possible fraud. Appropriately experienced non-executive directors, on the other hand, can provide a powerful incentive to create internal committees that can check excessive executive remuneration. They can also provide valuable support to independent auditors.

Laws, regulations and rules, Auditing, Practice, Business ethics, Industry self-regulation, Industry self regulation, Auditors

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Valuing the non-executive on a going concern basis

Article Abstract:

Non-executive directors can bring in an independent yet informed views to companies. They are especially valuable to small, closely held corporations whose boards are dominated by a few individuals who are often limited in all-around management skills. The non-executive, independent directors can balance the views of an entire board, hence ensuring that shareholders' interests are justly considered. They can further act as coordinators and catalysts for major changes within a company.

Small business, Executives

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Action on entrenchment

Article Abstract:

Research has revealed that the Cadbury Committee board structure reforms, which aimed to reduce managerial entrenchment in non-performing companies, have had some effect, however, managers are still protected from removal.

Appointments, resignations and dismissals, Chief executive officers

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