Managerial preference, asymmetric information, and financial structure

Article Abstract:

If firm performance affects managers' wealth or reputation, preferences of managers dominate firms' financing decisions. When information about real asset investment is symmetric, managers finance exclusively with equity. If managers know more about asset quality than do investors and if managers are sufficiently risk averse, they signal high-quality projects with debt. Increases in collateral value decrease risky debt use. Increases in interest rates that do not change productive opportunities increase debt use. The explanation for these and further results is based on underpricing of equity and overpricing of debt at the margin. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Planning, Compensation and benefits, Investments, Executives, Executive compensation

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Option bounds with finite revision opportunities

Article Abstract:

This article generalizes the single-period linear-programming bounds on option prices by allowing for a finite number of revision opportunities. It is shown that, in an incomplete market, the bounds on option prices can be derived using a modified binomial option-pricing model. Tighter bounds are developed under more restrictive assumptions on probabilities and risk aversion. For this case the upper bounds are shown to coincide with the upper bounds derived by Perrakis, while the lower bounds are shown to be tighter. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Prices and rates, Stock options

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