Partner selection and group information in cooperative benchmarking
Article Abstract:
Companies perform information sharing activities such as partner selection and group formation as part of cooperative benchmarking efforts to improve their business operations. Companies characterize a problem as difficult before gathering information about prospective business allies and continue gathering more information with increased uncertainty. An analysis of benchmarking benefits and costs shows a unique equilibrium group structure in which companies are differentiated by their technological information.
Publication Name: The Journal of Accounting and Economics
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0165-4101
Year: 1995
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Using delegation and control systems to mitigate the trade-off between the performance-evaluation and belief-revision uses of accounting signals
Article Abstract:
A principal agent framework was utilized to show why trade-offs arise in an agency relationship when the same accounting signal is utilized for both performance evaluation and investment evaluation. The incentive contract between a principal and her agent influences the agent's productive effort. The productive effort also promotes externalities on future investments by influencing the informativeness of the signal used for investment evaluation.
Publication Name: The Journal of Accounting and Economics
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0165-4101
Year: 1998
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