The statistical association between Central Bank independence and inflation

Article Abstract:

The importance traditionally given to the direct and positive relationship between central bank autonomy and the inflation rate is negated by results of a study of two leading banking institutions. The subject banks are the Bank of Japan which is dependent on other government institutions and the Federal Reserve which is relatively independent. Regression analysis of data shows that the Japanese bank performed much better in inflation control than the latter despite the latter's freedom to set the long-run inflation rate.

Federal Reserve Banks, Monetary Authorities - Central Bank, Research, Inflation (Finance), Inflation (Economics)

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Monetary policy goals and central bank independence

Article Abstract:

Central bank independence models have contributed to policymaking by proving that a prominent degree of independence from short-term political pressures is crucial for accomplishing and upholding price stability. The nature of the economy and the function of monetary policy should be taken into account in selecting central bank policy goals. The political and social setting of wider historical experience is another underlying consideration in choosing these goals.

Decision-making, Models, Decision making, Evaluation, Monetary policy

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