Were the good old days that good? Changes in managerial stock ownership since the Great Depression

Article Abstract:

We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Investments, History, Executives, Employee ownership

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The priority structure of corporate liabilities

Article Abstract:

Most discussions of corporate capital structure effectively assume that all debt is the same. Yet debt differs by maturity, covenant restrictions, conversion rights, call provisions, and priority. Here, we examine priority structure across a sample of 4995 COMPUSTAT industrial firms from 1981 to 1991. We analyze the variation in the use of capital leases, secured debt, ordinary debt, subordinated debt, and preferred stock both as a fraction of the firm's market value and as a fraction of total fixed claims. Our evidence provides consistent support for contracting cost hypotheses, mixed support for tax hypotheses, and little support for the signaling hypothesis. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Capital formation, Debt financing (Corporations), Debt financing

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Negotiated block trades and corporate control

Article Abstract:

We identify negotiated trades of large-percentage blocks of stock as corporate control transactions. When a block trades and the firm is not fully acquired, cumulative abnormal returns average 5.6%, and 33% of the chief executives are replaced within a year. Stock-price increases are larger when control passes to the new blockholder, when management does not resist the blockholder's effort to influence corporate policy, and when the block purchaser eventually fully acquires the firm. These findings suggest that the specific skills and expertise of blockholders, and not just the concentration of ownership, are important determinants of firm value. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Prices and rates, Stocks, Stock prices, Block trading

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