An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game

Article Abstract:

Determination of the strategies resulting from iterative elimination of dominated strategies in normal games is equivalent to the determination of the backward induction result of some extensive game. However, unlike the normal game form, the relevant extensive game provides data regarding the proper method of elimination. Implementation through a subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game having perfect data is equivalent to implementation via a guided iteratively elimination of dominated strategies.

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Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior

Article Abstract:

The factors of game theory can be incorporated into a theory of rational strategic behavior by doing away with the assumption that such factors will seek one principle of rationality. The major concepts of coherence and exogenous restrictions on beliefs are used together to connote an alternative analysis of problematic elements of game theory including iterative dominance, backward induction and invariance.

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Forward induction and public randomization

Article Abstract:

Forward induction loses its power to refine Nash equilibrium when a stage game's set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is convexified by the use of public random variables. The impotence of forward induction persists beyond games where public randomizing devices are at play. Forward induction has been observed to obtain its power solely from nonconvexities in value sets of equilibria in subgames.

Induction (Mathematics), Mathematical induction

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