Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods

Article Abstract:

A study applied non-Bayesian auction theory to investigate the allocation of impure public goods for which consumption is non-chivalrous but where exclusion is feasible. Examples of these public goods include parks, swimming pools, and uncongested schools. It was demonstrated that among all regular, strategy-proof mechanisms which are monotone and allow free entry, only mechanisms which are equivalent to the auction-like mechanisms maximize welfare.

United States, Case studies, Distribution, Public goods, Resource allocation

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Monopoly Power, Innovation and Economic Growth

Article Abstract:

Economic aspects of innovation and growth are discussed. Topics include the theory of monopoly power, a dynamic analysis of the cost of innovation, the intellectual property system, competition and creative destruction, knowledge spillovers, determining the value of innovation, new growth theory, and the role of government policy.

Statistical Data Included, Models, Economic aspects, Economic development, Intellectual property, Technological innovations, Monopolies, New products, Product introduction

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