Collusive auditors

Article Abstract:

The principal-agent theory is applied in the case of a shareholder-auditor-manager model. The shareholder acts as the principal while the manager acts as the agent. In such a setup, the auditor seeks to verify claims by the manager when demanded by the shareholder. The manager carries the incentive to bribe the auditor to cover-up undesirable audit results, while the shareholder must remain committed to the audit policy.

Accounting and auditing, Stockholders, Executives

---

Input versus output monitoring: who is the residual claimant?

Article Abstract:

The residual claimant acts as the rent source and is the principal determinant of choice between input or output monitoring under a principal-agent relationship. Efficiency of the monitoring mode is conditioned by the role the residual claimant plays in the relationship. Ability to select claimancy and the monitoring mode will make the principal select input monitoring and assume the claimant's role.

Research, Industrial productivity, Agency theory, Commercial agents

---

Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment

Article Abstract:

The usage of optimal contract between agents and auditors in the absence of perfect commitment is discussed.

United States, Personnel administration, Usage, Compensation and benefits

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: How much does it cost to mitigate the anthropogenic causes of climate change? The Russian public's ability and willingness to pay for housing and communal services
• Abstracts: An experiment with two-way offers into court: restoring the balance in pre-trial negotiation. The regulatory record of the Greenspan fed
• Abstracts: Small business inventories. Inventories. Small Business inventories
• Abstracts: Collective choice under dichotomous preferences. A new solution to the random assignment problem. Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
• Abstracts: Liquidity: Urban versus rural firms. Financing decisions when managers are risk averse. Issuer surplus and the partial adjustment of IPO prices to public information

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.