Decentralization and the coordination problem

Article Abstract:

The possibility of achieving an efficient equilibrium in a decentralized game proves to be high provided that the degree of decentralization is sufficient. In an analysis of a 2x2 normal form game with a large number of participants, learning process of players move towards efficient equilibrium when players are decentralized and are divided into groups. The findings show great importance in economics especially in the field of standardization where it suggests that achievement of an efficient standard is high if consumers are decentralized.

Analysis, Usage, Standardization, Economic research, Decentralization (Management)

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Learning in Cournot oligopoly - an experiment

Article Abstract:

Different learning theories have been tested in the context of a Cournot oligopoly by varying the information provided to subjects. Results show that some subjects imitate successful behavior if they have the necessary information, leading to more competitive markets. More information about demand and cost conditions results in less competitive behavior on the aggregate level, while more information about the profits and quantities of other firms produces more competitive behavior.

Models, Learning, Information theory, Teaching models

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Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies

Article Abstract:

A new series of experiments are conducted to study oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a unified frame. The experiment suggested that firms in duopolies manage to collude but it is difficult to achieve in markets with more firms.

United States, Forecasts, trends, outlooks, Science & research, Forecasts and trends, Market trend/market analysis, Financial markets

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