Discouraging rivals: managerial rent-seeking and economic inefficiencies
Article Abstract:
It is posited that managers invest in activities that create information asymmetries to preserve their jobs instead of exploiting their talents. A three-stage model of discouraging rivals is described to illuminate on this theory. In the first stage, the manager selects investments. In the second, the board of directors chooses the person who will manage the assets of the firm. Finally, the manager manages the assets. These managers invest to discourage rivals' efforts, to discourage applicants and to increase the winner's cruse of the rivals.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1995
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Helping infant economies grow: foundations of trade policies for developing countries
Article Abstract:
Effects of trade restrictions on economic development of developing countries are presented.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 2006
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