Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game
Article Abstract:
A study on the bargaining problem explored the issue of why one ought to assume an alternating offer structure in a bargaining game and in what manner do the results change if a different game form is assumed. An infinite horizon, two-person, simultaneous offer concession game with incomplete information and discounted payoffs was considered. It was shown that the assumption of alternating offers typically used in theoretical bargaining models arises endogenously as the unique equilibrium of a simultaneous-move infinite horizon concession game under certain conditions.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1997
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The optimal design of a market
Article Abstract:
The optimal design of market rules in a two-period market, where the number of agents and the execution of trades are limited and where agents arrive at different points in time, is examined. The study aims to develop trading rules for selecting a market maker. One of the findings indicate that Pareto inefficient allocations could result from competitive trading rules in both large and small economies.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1999
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Voluntary implementation
Article Abstract:
Research describing the conditions of voluntary economic implementation is presented. Particular attention is given to constraints of individual rationality or blocking coalitions of implementation, as well as to static and dynamic implementations.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2001
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