Executive rank, pay and project selection
Article Abstract:
An executive is not only responsible for setting the decision criteria for selecting projects. The importance of executive rank in determining the extent of use of incentive pay in general and equity based incentive pay is discussed.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 2003
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An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
Article Abstract:
Usage of an equilibrium model to find out relationship between executive compensation and manager's performance and misreporting is presented.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 2006
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Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives
Article Abstract:
A study on relationship between incentive compensation of managers and corporate tax avoidance in corporate governance is presented.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 2006
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