Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure
Article Abstract:
The function of the hostile takeover as a corrective mechanism on management in UK corporations is evaluated using company performance data before, during, and after hostile takeovers. An analysis of the data indicated that there was no evidence of poor managerial performance in the target companies before the hostile acquisition bid. It is therefore concluded that hostile takeovers do not act as a corrective tool for poorly-managed companies.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1996
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Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions
Article Abstract:
It is stated that the firms emerging from auction bankruptcy appear healthy as they typically go on to perform at par with industry rivals. Post Bankruptcy performance, leverage ratio and bankruptcy refiling probabilities are also reported.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 2003
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