Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents

Article Abstract:

A model is developed to assess the incentives that can be applied in a contracting problem wherein the principal enters in two-sided moral hazards with independent agents. This type of hazard in the partnership game is resolved when the team size is large enough to justify optimal incentive schemes, which eliminate the principal's incentive problem. This shows the role of information in optimizing incentives between agreements.

Partnerships, Models, Partnership, Letting of contracts, Competitive bidding, Incentives (Business)

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Factor analysis and arbitrage pricing in large asset economies

Article Abstract:

Exact factor pricing may be done for a full measure of assets and that there is a probability that every asset in a finite sample is exactly factor priced. The study shows that approximate factor structures exist in general which can be chosen optimally according to their explanatory power and that factor structures are robust in asset repackaging and to the use of proxies approximating true factors.

Pricing Policy, Usage, Prices and rates, Reports, Pricing, Factor analysis, Discriminant analysis, Arbitrage

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Pivotal players and the characterization of influence

Article Abstract:

Issues are presented concerning the strategic behavior of an individual and the way in which this behavior is affected by opponents' strategies or a mechanism such as majority rule. Individual contributions are compared with collective outcome.

Analysis, Business planning, Collective behavior

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