Inequality reducing properties of composite taxation
Article Abstract:
The inequality of composite tax systems can be reduced by implementing progressive tax schedules with constant elasticity. Sample taxation schemes which considers discrete and continuous distributions indicate that replacing tax schedules with more progressive ones reduces unequal distribution of after tax incomes. The approach is in contrast with the conditional approach used by Lambert and Pfahler which focused on pre-tax distribution.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
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Redistribute effects of minimal equal sacrifice taxation
Article Abstract:
The redistribution effect of taxation is examined through the theory of minimal equal sacrifice. The extend and the circumstances under which, the application of the principle of minimal equal sacrifice leads to more equally distributed incomes, are studied.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2003
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Consistent income tax structures when households are heterogeneous
Article Abstract:
The effect of income tax in terms of redistributuin is examined for populations that are heterogeneous.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2000
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