Institutional investors and corporate monitoring: a demand-side perspective

Article Abstract:

The US system of corporate governance stipulates the separation of ownership and control in publicly held corporations. The system has long been criticized for its failure to hold professional managers accountable for their actions. Increased institutional investor involvement in governance is seen to pose greater risks and costs to firms while providing other benefits. The benefits can be accounted for by assessing factors such as share price performance of both voting and non-voting stocks, the willingness of firms to go public, and the expedition in the replacement of managers performing below par.

Management Functions, Finance, Institutional investments

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Monitoring costs as a basis for the dispersion of firm ownership

Article Abstract:

Shareholders conduct systematic evaluation of their firm's managers to improve corporate performance. The relationship of the forms of ownership to the processes of monitoring costs in executive evaluation was studied. Previous research postulated that high profitability was associated with homogenous ownership. A new model proposed included greater shareholder participation in cost monitoring. The new model suggested that corporate performance could be improved even under conditions of dispersed ownership and that there is no ideal ownership form that will optimize corporate performance.

Costs, Industrial, Industrial costs

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Cross-ownership as a hostage exchange to support collaboration

Article Abstract:

Cooperation among corporations owned by interrelated groups is possible when respect for property rights is observed. An enforcing mechanism is postulated, wherein ownership is vested in the shareholders and managers exert managerial control. While the separation of control from ownership can be maintained, the cross-ownership of firms ensures cooperation. Large industrial groups interrelated by cross-ownership are found in Japan, Europe and the US.

Economic aspects

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