'Insurance reversal' in an agency model with uncertainty
Article Abstract:
Knightian uncertainty can be introduced into a model of two-states agency, and this can result in uncertainties about probability distributions. In cases where agents are optimistic about production activity outcomes, and principles are pesimistics, principals can fully insure themselves for a range of states of nature. This finding illuminates the role of uncertainty in principal-agent schemes, and points to the need for further research on Knightian uncertainty and equilibrium configurations.
Publication Name: Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0932-4569
Year: 1999
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Mechanism sufficient statistic in the risk-neutral agency problem
Article Abstract:
Research demonstrates that dichotomic monitoring systems should be used in principal-agent framework analysis. A mathematic model used to describe action space is illustrated and explained. Risk-neutral analysis is discussed.
Publication Name: Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0932-4569
Year: 1998
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