Interlinkage, investment and adverse selection
Article Abstract:
A model of imperfect information on agents' consumption behavior is used to analyze interlinked contracts. Results show that agents with low rates of time preferences are offered credit contracts while others are offered share and credit contracts, such as interlinked contacts. Findings further reveal that interlinkage of contracts reduces investment.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1995
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Formal and informal sector credit institutions and interlinkage
Article Abstract:
Issues relating to rural credit and the problem of asymmetric information are examined in detail, with policy implications for rural credit in poorer countries.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2001
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Interlinkage, limited liability and strategic interaction
Article Abstract:
Interlinked contracts are examined in a context of landlord and moneylender relating to a tenant with a limited liability status.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2000
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