Markov equilibria in discounted stochastic games
Article Abstract:
The presence of Markov perfect equilibrium was demonstrated in stochastic games which feature a state space that is a complete separable metric space and action spaces which are compact metric spaces. These stochastic games have transition probabilities that are Markovian and product measurable. If the transition probability is weak-continuous in actions made the previous day, a Markov perfect equilibrium strategy can be found for finite horizon games. A similar equilibrium is also present in infinite horizon games if the transition probability in every period is v(sub t)-continuous, rely only on the immediate past and is norm continuous in the last period.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1999
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Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies
Article Abstract:
An evaluation of an evolution and equilibria in coordination games wherein the entire population plays simultaneously reveals that payoffs and best replies may be determined by getting the population strategy profile. The study seeks to apply evolutionary dynamic to coordination games where deterministic adaptive processes have limited use. The resulting application uses deterministic adaptive processes to list possible predictions devoid of random perturbations that translates to the underlying equilibria of the coordination game.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1997
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D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
Article Abstract:
The coverage of Cho and Sobel's study showing uniqueness and existence results for D1 equilibria of signaling games with multiple signals is broadened by fulfilling several requirements. First, types derived from a compact interval are specified. Second, a broader incentive monotonicity condition is applied. Some forms of payoff functions indicate that the D1 equilibria of the continuum type model can be found in Bagwell and Ramey's complete-information distortion results.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
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