Multi-period information markets
Article Abstract:
Monopolistic information sellers tend to behave differently in a dynamic framework than in a static model. In a static model, sellers have to create some noise so as not to reveal the actual dividends of a particularly risky asset. On the other hand, Wang's work (1993) proves that selling the financial information in a multi-period model does not reveal the future dividends, compelling the trader not to add noise to its value. Factors such as state variables and strategy space of the seller affect the outcome of the sale.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0165-1889
Year: 1997
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Increasing returns, home production and persistence of business cycles
Article Abstract:
A business cycle model with a propagation mechanism can generate multiple equilibria because of external increasing returns to scale in the production of the market good. When the increasing returns are calculated in such a way that the spectra of the model and of the data output growth are nearest, their size is within the region that produces multiple equilibria. Consumption and labor flow in similar direction not only at the impact of the shock, but also for a few periods after that.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0165-1889
Year: 1998
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