On controlling crime with corrupt officials
Article Abstract:
Prevention of crimes proves to be futile when law enforcing officials are corrupt. A simple model of crime and corruption shows that crime cannot be placed under control if the reservation payoff of the official resembles the criminal's. It would still be very challenging to control crime even when the penalty is high because the effort of the corrupt official can have an effect on the probability of detection.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1998
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Cooperation in R&D: the case of patent infringement agreements
Article Abstract:
Research into the possibility of accidental infringement of patents is presented. It was possible to develop an insurance based argument behind patent infringement agreements, which can be seen as a type of cooperation in an otherwise non-cooperative climate.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2001
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Asymmetric capacity costs and joint venture buy-outs
Article Abstract:
The effects of asymmetric access to capital that leads to joint venture collapse are examined under the Indian concept
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2004
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