On rationalizability in extensive games

Article Abstract:

A model is developed to assess the implications of information on economic equilibria. The model tests the extensive form rationalizability (EFR), a form of forward induction principle which helps in the optimization of choices. Model shows that EFR can be used to consistently explain strategic rationality by assuming that players have a 'hierarchy of hypothesis' with which to range their choices and that the assumption is common knowledge at the beginning of the game. This assumption of strategic rationality explains optimal choices made by players.

Usage, Combinatorial optimization, Decision theory

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The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test in infinite signalling games

Article Abstract:

An examination is made of the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response (NWBR) test in the sequential equilibrium concept in infinite signaling games. The test defines the conditions wherein the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game, resulting in the development of the equilibria for a class of infinite signaling games. This development comes from the use of assumptions to prove the existence of equilibria than by merely determining the properties of equilibria.

Information measurement

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Aggregation, determinacy, and information efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information

Article Abstract:

A determination of the equilibrium trades in quasi-complete economies showed that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton and that these equilibria provide the necessary conditions for the formation of a partially informative equilibria. This is the due to the action of the Gorman aggregation which can be effected both in symmetric and asymmetric information environments.

Economic research

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