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On the generic efficiency of takeovers under incomplete information

Article Abstract:

The mechanism design technique is extended to financial assets. A research study investigates the welfare implications of popular linkages between shareholdings and control in corporate mergers and consolidations. Plurality mechanisms display a generic efficiency when private information is available to all contenders except the incumbent. However, majority rules are generically inefficient if there are over two contenders. Results show that under incomplete information circumstances, common share and control linkages could exhibit incompatibility with generic efficiency.

Author: Nagarajan, S.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1995
Research, Acquisitions and mergers

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Ideal structures of path independent choice functions

Article Abstract:

Ideals are important in providing the conditions for semigroup classes that are related to choice function classes that support the Strong Axiom of Preference, the Weak Axiom of Revealed Performance or Path Independence. Semigroups with non-path-independent choice functions are shown to have insufficient ideal structures. Automata results are easily applied to economics and direct tests of an automaton's economic characteristics via search-process foundations to choice functions.

Author: Johnson, Mark R.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1995
Finite state automata

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Three solutions for the compensation problem

Article Abstract:

A research study presents three solutions to the compensation problem in which the partial compensation can be performed. The factor sorting process is not addressed in the analysis. Efforts are made to develop a fair division model with differential claims that are based on talents and handicaps. The conditional equality and egalitarian-equivalence solutions are found to have dual properties, while the consistency axiom is found to possess strong consequences in one-good models.

Author: Fleurbaey, Marc
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1995
Economic aspects, Wages, Wages and salaries

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Subjects list: Analysis, Economic research
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