Organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining
Article Abstract:
Companies with nonbinding labor contracts, or employment-at-will firms are likely to engage in wage negotiations any time. Under this type of contract the employer is not bound to pay a future wage and employees are not bound to render services. The employer provides capital based on the average inframarginal productivity. It is determined that these companies tend to be overemployed and their capital not fully utilized. This happens because groups with power to control payment of wages tend to create additional positions to maintain power.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1996
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Organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining: comment
Article Abstract:
A model for intrafirm wage bargaining as developed by Lars A. Stole, et al., is critically examined. The model indicates the bargaining power a firm can exercise based on the workers who are irreplaceable at the time of transfer of technology.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 2003
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Organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining: reply
Article Abstract:
The critical remarks of Catherine C. de Fontenay, et al., on the study related to the bargaining power a firm can exercise based on the workers who are irreplaceable at the time of transfer of technology is discussed.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 2003
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