Payoff continuity in incomplete information games

Article Abstract:

The existence of an approximate equilibrium in a game determines the strategic closeness of a particular payoff function to the game's overall probability distribution. The correlation between the two factors, first studied by Monderer and Samet, further provides evidence for the proximity of information when fixed type spaces are considered. It was shown that two probability distribution functions can only be deemed strategically close if, and only if conditional probabilities to all events are similar and both are characterized by a matching ex ante probability.

Models, Continuity, Continuity (Mathematics)

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Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring

Article Abstract:

A model shows that an almost efficient sequential equilibrium can be achieved, provided that imperfectness of signals is small and players are patient. However, this holds true for only a limited class of prisoner's dilemma and can only be generally effective when additional assumptions on the structure of private monitoring are gathered. Result, which can be applied to stage games, depends on the qualities of a prisoner's dilemma including the action conforming to a productive deviation from the cooperative phase is equal to the one used to punish deviators.

Psychology & Psychiatry, Prisoner's dilemma game

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Unfolding social hierarchies

Article Abstract:

Social hierarchies are examined using the concepts of social learning, equilibrium, and the tool of coordination games.

Economic aspects, Social classes, Social class

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