Renegotiation-proof lotteries equilibrium in an economy with private information
Article Abstract:
A study explored the credibility of classical general equilibrium theory results in private information economies in which a renegotiation of initial contracts is possible. Competitive equilibria with contracts are found to be existent and optimal in economies with principal-agent problems such as moral hazards and renegotiation-proof contracts. Financial intermediaries are shown to develop in an endogenous manner when financial intermediaries become essential in supporting the private information economy's competitive equilibrium allocations.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1995
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On a market for coalitions with indivisible agents and lotteries
Article Abstract:
Direct lottery markets were shown to follow a pattern of the equivalence of coalitional games and markets, specifically the totally L-balanced games. An analysis of this kind of market game showed that the reaction is based on superadditivity, and not on the balancedness that generally characterizes these games. The results show that using balancing weights to specify duration for the formation of coalitions may not be operative in some coalitional formation models.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1997
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Cores and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities and lotteries
Article Abstract:
The exchange model of Shapley and Scarf is extended to include lotteries in determining equilibrium allocations in competitive markets. The extended model, which also considers core and competitive results, uses lotteries as probability distribution of indivisible commodities when made possible by viable allocations and blocking coalitions' allocations. Lottery equilibrium allocations are found to be non-empty, incomplete and contained only in the lottery core.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
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