Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment

Article Abstract:

The commitment towards an insurance contract is discussed in relation to the broader concept of long-term economic relationships. The situation under study is characterized by the freedom of the agent to get away from an existing contract and transfer his commitment to another insurer. Such a situation is considered a one-sided commitment. An equilibrium setup occurs when there exists no incentive to reject a contract.

Contracts, Insurance policies

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On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard

Article Abstract:

The impact of moral hazard on long-term consumption or utility was investigated through isolation of the influences of numerous types of assumptions. A negative utility is observed for subjects with unobservable endowments whenever any positive fraction of otherwise similar agents posses observable endowments. Results similar to a continuum of agents were also noted whenever a finite number of agents is assumed.

Models, Consumption (Economics), Utility theory, Utility functions

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A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence

Article Abstract:

Recursive methods are set out, which are helpful in understanding links in private variables over time.

Analysis, Recursive functions

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