Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games

Article Abstract:

A model of infinitely repeated game wherein a player with strict discounting competes against a patient player without discounting. In this model, the patient player acquires dynamic Stackelberg payoff by mimicking an appropriate irrational type. Payoff is high when the patient player's opponent responds to said irrational type. This result is proven by identifying a lower bound on the rational patient player's payoff in any trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the perturbed game.

Strategic planning (Business), Game theory, Perturbation (Mathematics)

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Reputation and entry deterrence under short-run ownership of a firm

Article Abstract:

A model is developed to determine the role played by short-term ownership of an enterprise in preventing the entry of competitors in the industry. Results show that, regardless of the firm's type, an equilibrium exists wherein short-term owners adopt the same aggressive action to prevent new entrants. On the other hand, long-term owners act depending on the type of business. High-cost firms permit new entrants while low-cost firms bar the entry of competitors.

Competition (Economics), Entrepreneurship

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Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions

Article Abstract:

In auctions, communication is found to be more economically effective than collusion.

Japan, Science & research, Research, Letting of contracts, Competitive bidding, Auctions, Collusion

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