Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions

Article Abstract:

The information processing conditions of the Nash model and the signal-averaging rule are applied to the case of English common value auctions. These auctions increased revenue more than first-price auctions only when bidders did not suffer the strong winner's curse. Although the Nash model integrated other bidders' drop-out prices and private information, the alternative model showed closer correlation to auction data.

Models, Selling, Auctions

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Lessons learned: generalizing learning across games

Article Abstract:

Studies about econometric analysis indicating the positive transfer between games with different equilibria are presented. Two features of the environment that helps to explain when and why this positive transfer occurs are explored.

United States, Analysis, Econometrics, Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics)

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Experimental confirmation of the existence of a Giffen good

Article Abstract:

Giffen-good effects, an exception to the law of demand, were observed in a four phase experiment. A Giffen good phenomenon is equivalent to a positively sloping demand curve.

Consumption (Economics), Consumer behavior

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