Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information

Article Abstract:

A concept of stable equilibrium in beliefs is presented by assuming common knowledge amongst players who are averse to uncertainty, in extensive games with perfect information. This paper utilizes rationality as an appealing criterion of stability to develop the notion of stable equilibrium in beliefs.

Canada, Influence, Information theory, Equilibrium (Economics), Rational choice theory

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Genetic algorithm learning and evolutionary games

Article Abstract:

The author regards economic genetic algorithm learning not only as an evolutionary process based on a one-population standard, but as an evolutionary, dynamic game since its fitness is dependent on the state of the whole population.

Germany, Standards, Learning models (Stochastic processes), Population, Stochastic processes, Stochastic models

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Empire building by corporate managers: the corporation as a savings instrument

Article Abstract:

Empire building is examined in relation to uncertainty, and a tendency for managers to overinvest is identified and explained.

Management Theory & Techniques, Management, Corporations

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