Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with implementation costs

Article Abstract:

The theory on subperfect equilibrium for repeated games as proposed by Rubinstein is extended by focusing on payoff factors. In cases where players are constrained to employ only reactive strategies, the set of subgame perfect outcome payoffs is only minimally decreased. On the other hand, if players are permitted full freedom to use whatever strategies are available, no difference in payoffs is identified.

Game theory

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Equilibrium of repeated games with costs of implementation

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the payoff discontinuity is presented. Under the standard approach to Nash equilibrium in repeated games, the implementation of strategies entails no costs and the classical folk theorem holds. Earlier studies predicted economic agents' concern with payoffs and strategy complexity. It is shown that a 'full' folk theorem emerges by redefining finite automata and complexity standards.

Models, Economics, Economic indicators

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Voting by committees under constraints

Article Abstract:

The way of voting under constraints by the committees, where the voters have to choose a subset from a set of objects is explained.

Legal issues & crime, Strategy & planning, Government regulation (cont), Government regulation, Spain, Legal/Government Regulation, Methods, Planning, Usage, Laws, regulations and rules, Voting, Set theory, Company business planning, Fuzzy sets, Committees

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