The evolution of social norms in common property resource use
Article Abstract:
The problem of drawing out commonly owned renewable resources is studied within an evolutionary-game-theoretic framework. Findings reveal that cooperative behavior established by standards of restraint and punishment may be stable against the intrusion of narrowly self-interested behavior. The impact of modifications in prices, technology and social cohesion on extraction behavior and the long-run stock are examined. Social norms can break down if threshold values of the parameters are exceeded, causing a reduction in the long-run stock.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1996
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What can we learn from cultural group selection and co-evolutionary models?
Article Abstract:
According to Joseph Henrich, an understanding of cultural group selection and the co-evolution of genes and culture will promote the understanding of human psychology and preferences. Few criticisms regarding pro-social preferences are analyzed.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2004
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Comments
Article Abstract:
Joseph Henreich's work on cultural group selection, human behavior, territoriality and green beards are discussed. Comments on his work are presented and few additional points are added to his work.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2004
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- Abstracts: Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes, and large-scale cooperation: a comment. Cultural group selection, co evolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation (by Joseph Henrich)