The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies
Article Abstract:
A study was conducted to evaluate possible explanations for corporate financing-, dividend- and compensation-policy choices. The study reports empirical relations between such corporate policies and integral firm characteristics. Results show that contracting theories best explain the development of corporate regulations compared to tax-based and signaling theories.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1992
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Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: evidence from Indonesia
Article Abstract:
Implications of the Indonesian firms' political influences on international financing, corporate transparency and efficiency are examined.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 2006
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The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting
Article Abstract:
Effects of performance based chief executive officer compensation contracts on revenue misreporting is presented.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 2006
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