The level of optimal fines to prevent fraud when reputations exist and penalty clauses are unenforceable

Article Abstract:

The Sentencing Commission's 1991 sentencing guidelines for federal crimes committed by business organizations require fines to be computed solely on the basis of a crime's social costs. However, the greater probability of higher fines under this system does not prevent people from maintaining that the guidelines can only imposed too low a level of fines on corporate offenders. However, further study indicates that subsidizing information that leads to revelations of fraud is likely to be more efficient in deterring corporate crime than merely imposing fines.

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Doctrine for destruction: the case of corporate criminal liability

Article Abstract:

Corporate crime caught the attention of the public with the Sentencing Commission's 1991 announcement of sentencing guidelines for federal crimes committed by business organizations. However, the public's growing interest in the topic notwithstanding, questions on the necessity of corporate criminal sentencing remain unanswered. One view posits that there is no need for corporate criminal sentencing since it rests on a faulty theory of liability that is destructive when viewed from the moral, legal or economic standpoints.

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The economics of corporate criminal liability

Article Abstract:

The average level of fines imposed for federal crimes committed by business organizations was substantially raised by the Sentencing Commission in 1991. Some quarters have criticized the increase as being fundamentally flawed in terms of the way they are imposed and calculated. However, with criminal fraud as an example, the heightened fines imposed under the 1991 sentencing guidelines are shown to possess a strong economic basis.

Economic aspects

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