The winner's curse and public information in common value auctions: reply

Article Abstract:

James C. Cox, et al (CDS), have pointed out an error in the study conducted by John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (KL) with respect to the theoretical benchmark for the effects of public information. However, CDS did not provide a solution which left the question of the correct benchmark unanswered. KL's corrected solution all the more strengthens the earlier conclusions of KL that average revenue is reduced by public information which is in contrast to the Nash equilibrium bidding theory.

Research, Letting of contracts, Competitive bidding

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Coordination in auctions with entry

Article Abstract:

Investigations into the equilibriums formed when bidders coordinate with one another in a costless bidding situation, showed that bidders received higher interim payoffs than if no coordination between bidders occured. This is due to the particular equilibria formed in the bidding subgame, which plays off on equilibrium against another. These results are operational only on the condition that the bidding is costless and it is done under the fixed auction rule.

Models, Information theory, Information theory in economics

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Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?

Article Abstract:

A model of heterogeneous bidderss set up and adverse impacts of insiders are examined in the context of a linkage effect.

Economic aspects, Information management

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