Too much monitoring, not enough performance pay

Article Abstract:

Empirical evidence shows that the choice of incentive scheme is dependent on market price. This can be gleaned from the endogenization of the internal organization of competitive firms using a simple general equilibrium model, where the options are monitored teams, unmonitored teams motivated by performance pay and self-employment. It was found that the conditions for a competitive equilibrium to be constrained efficient are restrictive, allowing everyone to gain from policies that limit monitoring and self-employment and from the introduction of entry taxes.

Organizational Methods NEC, Models, Economic aspects, Organizational effectiveness, Organizational change, Self-employed persons, Self employed persons, Wages, Wages and salaries, Incentives (Business)

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Equal worth, equal opportunities: pay and promotion in an internal labour market

Article Abstract:

Women face more barrier in getting promoted than men. Internal labor market data in the UK indicate that some barriers, such as lack of work experience, have more significant effects than the usual factors that induce gender discrimination such as maternity benefits. While the impact of discrimination barriers are more pronounced in lower-pay positions, women are given relatively equal chances when they reach top-level positions. It is concluded that the impact of promotion criteria for both genders depends on their attributes.

United Kingdom, Management, Women, Employment, Labor market, Employment discrimination

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Job responsibility, pay and promotion

Article Abstract:

A theoretical analysis of the link between responsibility, pay and promotion is limited to self-enforcing termination contracts. The link between the extent of responsibility and the contract's parameters is examined using a model that represents a dynamic game between workers and an employer. The model reveals that, despite similar qualifications and similar tasks, employers can maximize gains by a differentiated wage scheme and a job ladder.

Job Description & Qualifications, Employee Promotion, Labor contracts, Job descriptions, Job qualifications

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