Wage Indexation, Employment and Inflation

Article Abstract:

Price versus productivity-indexing is considered in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information and wage bargaining. In a perfectly price-indexed economy, the inflationary bias due to lack of credibility is eliminated. However, productivity-indexing is more appropriate to dampen macroeconomic fluctuations that are caused by real disturbances. We show that productivity-indexing alone guarantees both price and employment stability, provided the government's reputation is good enough and the union's bargaining power is not too strong. This reduces the degree of price indexation as the union becomes weaker and the government's reputation improves. Productivity-indexing is desirable with volatile productivity processes and weak unions. Keywords: Wage indexation; monetary policy; reputational equilibrium JEL classification: E24; E52

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Progressive Taxation and Wage Setting: Some Evidence for Denmark

Article Abstract:

The proposition that a progressive tax system contributes to wage moderation is studied using Danish earnings data disaggregated by occupation, gender and earnings level. Our main conclusions are that income-tax progression affects wage setting, but whether it moderates or exaggerates wage pressure is income dependent. An increase in progressivity reduces the pre-tax earnings of middle-income workers (manual male workers and moderate income earners among both male and female non-manual workers). The reverse is found for high-income earners (non-manual male workers), in that an increase in progressivity tends to raise pre-tax earnings. Finally, there is no significant effect of tax progressivity on the wages of low-income earners. Keywords: Wage determination; income-tax progression JEL classification: H3; J3; J5; J6

Denmark

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Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy-making and Politics

Article Abstract:

The costs and benefits of cooperative monetary and fiscal policy are analysed in the framework of a partisan business-cycles model. It is shown that political parties with different ideologies prefer to choose different arrangements for macroeconomic policy-making. More specifically, fight-wing parties favour independent central banks more than left-wing parties. An independent central bank is also the generally preferred option from a social welfare point of view. In addition, the form of policy-making arrangements between the fiscal and monetary authorities is shown to influence the extent of partisan cycles. Keywords: Cooperation; monetary and fiscal authorities; independent central banks; partisan cycles JEL classification: E32; E58; E63; C72

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