An emprical investigation of coalitional barganing procedures
Article Abstract:
A new data set on government formation in 11 parliamentary democracies is used to empirically investigate, which selection rule most closely approximates the data. This is done while there is little empirical support for selection in order of seat share, but proportional selection, fits the data well.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 2004
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An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods
Article Abstract:
A study comparing three collective clinical procedures for the provision of excludable public goods under incomplete information, is presented. The three clinical procedures are, serial cost sharing (SCR), voluntary cost sharing with proportionate rebates (PCS) and with no rebates (NR).
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 2005
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Democrats, Republicans, and taxes: evidence that political parties matter
Article Abstract:
Analysis showing the tax burden on the state government with respect to the political parties is presented.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 2006
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