Discriminatory price auctions in electricity markets: low volatility at the expense of high price levels
Article Abstract:
Price volatility can be decreased for electricity when a discriminatory price auction is held. But discriminatory price auctions and uniform price auctions can produce high electricity prices in a structural market power system.
Publication Name: Journal of Regulatory Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0922-680X
Year: 2003
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Strategic pricing when electricity is storable
Article Abstract:
Using an oligopolistic model where hydroelectric utilities compete and replenishing of water reserves is stochastic, the research shows strategic behavior dispatch efficiency, price cap effect, and collusion likelihood.
Publication Name: Journal of Regulatory Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0922-680X
Year: 2001
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Incentive contracts for infrastructure, litigation and weak institutions
Article Abstract:
The theory of incentive contracts of government for public projects through private-sector participation, which may result in excessive litigation costs by private firm over contract terms, is analyzed.
Publication Name: Journal of Regulatory Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0922-680X
Year: 2005
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