Federal acid rain games
Article Abstract:
Acid rain games played under three distinct institutional environments were considered to assess the efficiency of federations in controlling acid rain. A socially optimal subgame perfect equilibrium was observed in a two-stage game where regional governments are Stackelberg leaders and control pollution taxes. On the other hand, an inefficient subgame perfect equilibrium that corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of a game where regional governments control both policy instruments was observed in a two-stage game where the central government is the Stackelberg leader and control pollution taxes. Analysis shows that a European-style federation in which regional governments precommit by setting pollution taxes prior to the creation of regional abatement policies by the central government is socially optimal.
Publication Name: Journal of Urban Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0094-1190
Year: 1999
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Analysis of urban land shortages: the case of Korean cities
Article Abstract:
A study was conducted to investigate urban land shortages and to formulate a measure of urban land shortage and surplus from a scrutiny of land price gradients within the structure of the conventional monocentric urban model. Urban land shortages may be caused by government laws plus the natural constraints on urban land use. Korea provides a system of highly strict controls on the conversion of land use from rural to urban while demonstrating an astonishing rate of economic growth and urbanization. The urban model is applied to gauge the extent of urban land shortages in 171 cities in that country. Results found that severe land shortages existed in six of the largest cities and in cities in Kyunggi Province.
Publication Name: Journal of Urban Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0094-1190
Year: 1998
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