Health effects and optimal environmental taxes
Article Abstract:
Information on environmental taxation in the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes shows that interactions with these distortions tend to increase the cost of an environmental tax as a result of which, the optimal environmental tax is less than marginal environmental damages. The model represents that, interactions with health effects from pollution are likely to reduce the optimal environmental tax, thus, reinforcing the belief that tax-interactions raise the costs of an environmental tax.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 2003
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A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
Article Abstract:
An explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations is presented describing the distribution pattern of regulatory surplus between firms and regulator. The impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation is also analyzed.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 2003
User Contributions:
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