Information, holdouts, and land assembly

Article Abstract:

A study is conducted to solve for the equilibria of a land assembly game. Although there are many perfect Bayesian equilibria, there is only one that does not consider play of weakly dominated strategies. This equilibrium has three significant features. The first is that the developer's bid is uninformative, thereby making landowners' counteroffers dependent only on their priors. The second characteristic is that it involves a holdout problem where smaller landowners demand larger per-acre prices for their land. If there are several landowners, the price will be higher if an agreement is reached, and mutually beneficial agreements will be missed at most times. The third feature of the equilibrium is that, if the landowners' asking prices are strategic complements, certain landowners can be persuaded to agree with a low bid since this convinces other landowners to control their own asking prices.

Letting of contracts, Competitive bidding, Landowners, Conditional sales contracts

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Gated communities and the economic geography of crime

Article Abstract:

Gating lessens the occurrence of crime by diverting it to other communities. Specifically, the number of active criminals in one community is reduced by higher gating expenditures. Integration of a microeconomic model of crime into a game-theoretic model of community also reveals that gating has an overall deterrent effect on crime when legitimate employment opportunities are not affected by crime. Gating expenditures are classified as strategic substitutes when the number of active criminals in a community is concave in relation to community's aggregate loss from crime. On the other hand, they are classified as strategic complements when increased expenditures by one community result to increased expenditures in other communities.

Fences & Gates ex Wire, Ornamental and Architectural Metal Work Manufacturing, Architectural metal work, Usage, Equipment and supplies, Urban economics, Architectural metalwork, Crime prevention, Gates (for fences, etc.), Gates (Closures)

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Urban development with lags

Article Abstract:

A model of urban development marked by uncertainty when there is a lag between the decision to begin a project and its completion is developed. Three important results are found. One is that there is an opportunity to expedite the development in the presence of lags as a result of uncertainty. Another is that development is less sensitive to uncertainty than in the absence of lags. The other finding is that, when distant land is developed before a nearby land, lags may result in leapfrog development. These findings emerge since the addition of lags to the development decision generates an opportunity cost of waiting that works against the common benefit of waiting in an uncertain situation.

Models, Project management, City planning, Urban planning

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