Rent seeking and tax competition

Article Abstract:

A formal model is constructed to take into account local and regional government policy which favors landowners. The model assumes that people own land only in their birthplace. Nash equilibrium is efficient when no migration in labor or capital is required to be efficient. It is concluded that differences in the size of people's holdings mattered more than differences in the location of people's holdings.

Economic aspects, Federalism, Fiscal policy, Taxation, Economic rent

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Public input competition

Article Abstract:

The adverse implications of competition for public investments in infrastructure are discussed. The reasons for such adverse outcomes are analyzed. Under non-competitive environment, public investment in infrastructure fosters development of regional economy by drawing in resources like skilled labor.

Canada, Government expenditures, Market information - general, Methods, Infrastructure (Economics), Supply and demand, Public investments, Regional development, Government finance

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Efficient migration and redistribution

Article Abstract:

The highly progressive tax system is one of the source for emigration with the most income-earning potential. Redistribution of the gains from migration is only possible between and within states and also depends on the government's ability to target taxes or subsidies towards immigrants.

United States, Tax policy, Emigration policy

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