Strategic information revelation in fundraising

Article Abstract:

The fundraiser's objective is to collect maximal contribution which shows that whether the public project is convex or non-convex, it can be the key to the fundraiser's announcement decision. In the convex case, the number is always revealed, in the non-convex case the number may not be revealed at all, or sometimes revealed only when it is in an intermediate range.

Convex functions

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Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising

Article Abstract:

A systematic attempt to introduce identification of subjects and their donations into an experiment on the provision of public goods is presented. Further, two supplemental conditions meant to mimic common fund-raising practices that had influences on behaviour is discussed.

Public goods

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The infornmational value of sequential fundraising

Article Abstract:

According to the economic theory, fundraisers contribute largest, when past contribution is not announced. Hence, an announcement strategy helps the fundraiser to reduce the free-rider problem.

Valuation

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