Open access in the power industry: competition, cooperation, and policy dilemmas
Article Abstract:
Both competition and cooperation among electric utilities pose risks to efficiency, consumer welfare and the public interest. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission needs to assess the welfare implications of allowing generating companies access to shared transmission lines because cooperation may undermine the anticipated benefits of competition. If competition results in the duplication of facilities, deregulation may not result in consumer welfare gains. Recovery of the stranded costs incurred by existing utilities must also be addressed to avoid imposing a disproportionate burden on smaller consumers.
Publication Name: Antitrust Law Journal
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0003-6056
Year: 1996
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Antitrust, joint ventures, and electric utility restructuring: RTGs and Poolcos
Article Abstract:
Antitrust enforcement agencies must allow electric utilities some leeway in developing more competitive and cost-effective alternatives to existing power generation and distribution systems. With the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proposing that access to transmission lines be opened up to all, some utilities and some states wish to respond by creating cooperative ventures. Deregulation will serve to limit the regulatory antitrust defenses available to utilities. Antitrust enforcers must allow cooperative behavior to the extent that welfare and efficiency benefits will result.
Publication Name: Antitrust Law Journal
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0003-6056
Year: 1996
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Measuring market power in electric generation
Article Abstract:
Models based on simulated electricity market behavior are likely to prove more informative and valuable to antitrust enforcers in assessing mergers and other market share changes that will result from electric utility deregulation. Traditional market power measures, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, may tend to chill procompetitive mergers and acquisitions following the breakup of utility monopolies by overstating market power. Simulations of pricing behavior can be developed that will more effectively assess the potential for anticompetitive behavior.
Publication Name: Antitrust Law Journal
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0003-6056
Year: 1996
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
- Abstracts: The minimum wage, the earned income tax credit, and optimal subsidy policy. In memoriam Walter J. Blum
- Abstracts: Intel inside? The poor lawyer's guide to upgrading your computer. Dealing with data obsolescence
- Abstracts: Tax apportionment and the pour-over will. The joys of a taxable CRT. IRS loosens rules on gifts from revocable trusts
- Abstracts: The pitfalls of fidelity insurance; banks seeking coverage for employee fraud face four hurdles: timely notice, discovery, termination and manifest intent
- Abstracts: A critical assessment of intracorporate loss shifting after prosecutions based on corporate wrongdoing. Beyond Aronson: recent Delaware cases on demand futility