Equilibrium analysis of an economy with innovations
Article Abstract:
A economic model is presented in which innovations are considered as goods characterized by a set of new qualities. The qualities of the innovations are considered a subset and they are made the elements of a lattice. The innovations are transformed into intellectual goods, such as software, and copies are sold to consumers. The existence of equilibria is analyzed under various price and market conditions.
Publication Name: The Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0304-4068
Year: 1997
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Dynamic Cournot oligopolies with production adjustment costs
Article Abstract:
Dynamic oligopolies for single products are examined in instances when Cournot expectations exist and an additional condition involving product adjustment costs is present. It is shown that, in such instances, the resulting system is discrete and possesses global asymptotical stability. Furthermore, necessary and sufficient conditions for global stability are also derived and special cases discussed.
Publication Name: The Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0304-4068
Year: 1995
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A note on the stability of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium: the multiproduct case with adaptive expectations
Article Abstract:
Dynamic multi-product oligopolies are examined and exceptions to a rule are found. The model is then extended to cover cases where adaptive expectations are involved.
Publication Name: The Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0304-4068
Year: 2000
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