Self-confirming equilibrium

Article Abstract:

An analysis of self-confirming equilibrium is presented. The equilibrium set assumes that player action is a function of his belief about other players, which are accurate following an equilibrium path ofplay. Repeated play of this equilibrium type generates consistent belief observation which is not necessarily correct. It is shown that self-confirming equilibria and the Nash equilibria exhibit differences.

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Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium

Article Abstract:

An analysis of steady state learning and the Nash Equilibrium is presented. Under steady state systems, players adjust to oppposing strategies by updating Bayesian frameworks based on their perceptionsof state. Random assignments for a fixed extensive-form game are established for matched players, where an individual player follows realized action in his own matches but does not do so for other matches.

Learning, Economic stagnation

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Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent

Article Abstract:

A game is presented between a patient player and a nonmyopic, less patient player. Reputation models assume that a patient player uses private information and that he is committed to playing according to a particular strategy. The extent to which an uncommitted patient player will use to his advantage his patient opponent's uncertainty to keep up his reputation for being a committed player is analyzed.

Analysis

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