CEO locus of control and small firm performance: an integrative framework and empirical test

Article Abstract:

Previous research on the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) locus of control is mainly based on simple and partial mappings of bivariate associations between CEO locus of control and organizational outcomes. In addition, distinct substreams have emerged in which intricately related phenomena are studied separately. To overcome this fragmentation and polarization, we provide and empirically test an integrative framework based on previously tested hypotheses on the impact of CEO locus of control. Our approach differs from prior research in two ways. First, it simultaneously takes account of strategic choice and firm performance in order to assess the extent to which strategy mediates the relationship between CEO locus of control and organizational performance. Second, we consider the CEO to be both a formulator and implementor of organizational strategies. Besides the observation that CEO locus of control seems to matter a lot in terms of explaining organizational performance in the present sample, our results demonstrate that an integrative approach increases our insight into the impact of CEO locus of control by revealing why some CEOs achieve higher organizational performance than others. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Small business, Chief executive officers

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Middle managers and the employee psychological contract: agency, protection and advancement

Article Abstract:

This paper investigates the construction and enactment of the employee psychological contract by a sample of middle-level line and personnel managers responsible for introducing job change in the air traffic control sector. We show how middle managers' concerns with fulfilling their own contractual commitments to senior management are perceived to conflict with meeting obligations to subordinates under the employment agreement. Thus, we illustrate our main argument that middle managers who are exposed to more exacting performance demands and controls do not simply subordinate employee concerns to their own interests. They seek to disguise the presence and outcomes of employee disaffection and to manipulate the impressions of senior management. We conclude that far from increasing individual accountability at middle levels such stringent controls may yield interpersonal rivalry, lower standards of employee treatment and the subversion of corporate aims. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Labor contracts, Human resource directors, Middle managers

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An empirical exploration of decision-making under agency controls and stewardship structure

Article Abstract:

Research on individual behavior indicates that agency control fosters more investment in profit-maximizing alternatives than does stewardship control. Agency control involves providing incentives and monitoring behaviors, while stewardship control presupposes that individuals will behave to the benefit of the organization without specific controls.

Behavior Theory, Comparative analysis, Human behavior, Decision theory, Human acts, Human behaviour

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